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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY and AARON D. 
KENNARD, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No.: 20010101-SC 
Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of 
the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0')-
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether a petition for judicial review of a governmental entity's denial of an 
administrative appeal is timely filed when the petition is filed 26 days after the denial 
and where the statute allows 30 days to file the petition? R. 84. 
II. Whether records of adjudicated disciplinary investigations of governmental 
employees are public records under the Governmental Records Access Management 
Act? R. 54. 
1 
III. Whether a governmental entity can deny a party whose employment they terminated 
access to records relevant to the termination by classifying the records as "protected" 
under the Governmental Records Access Management Act? R. 97. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because all the issues in this appeal are based upon the statutory interpretation of 
Governmental Records Access Management Act, the standard of review is under the 
correction-of-error standard. Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 
363 (Ut. App. 1999). In reviewing the district court's order, this Court may affirm a trial 
court's decision on any proper ground, even if the trial court based its decision on a different 
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1998). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-102 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-301 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns a review of a governmental entity's denial of a Governmental 
Records Access Management Act (hereinafter "GRAMA") request. The request was filed 
2 
by an employee whose employment was terminated by the governmental entity and was 
submitted to acquire records relevant to the termination for an administrative proceeding 
challenging the termination. 
Brent Young (hereinafter "Young") was employed as a deputy for the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff s Department (hereinafter "County"). On January 14,2001, Young was 
disciplined and his employment was terminated by the County. Young subsequently 
challenged his termination and appealed to the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission (hereinafter "Merit Commission"). To address the second of two issues before 
the Merit Commission on the consistency and proportionality of his discipline, Young 
submitted a GRAMA request for copies of disciplinary records of other deputies who were 
investigated and disciplined for similar conduct. The County refused to provide Young 
copies of all records he requested. 
As a consequence of the County's refusal to provide Young with copies of the records 
he requested, Young filed an action in the district court seeking judicial review of the 
County's refusal. The district court heard the case on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The court granted Young's motion for summary judgment and denied the County's motion. 
The County appealed the district court's summary judgment order which serves as the basis 
for this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Young was employed as a merit deputy sheriff with the County. R. 65. On January 
14,2001, Young was disciplined and his employment was terminated by the County. R. 65. 
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According to the final order of his termination, Young was terminated for exercising poor 
judgment in his interactions with a minor female by using his firearm in an unauthorized 
manner and using certain language to interact with the minor that had the potential for sexual 
innuendo. R. 65 and 123. Young challenged his termination and appealed it to the Merit 
Commission. R. 49. 
The County maintains a policy that any discipline must be consistent to that imposed 
in similar cases, must be fair and must be appropriate or proportional to the conduct. R. 150. 
To address the consistency and proportionality of his discipline before the Merit 
Commission, Young submitted a GRAMA request with the County for copies of records of 
disciplinary investigations of other deputies that involved conduct similar to the conduct for 
which he was terminated. R. 50. In a correspondence dated March 14, 2000, the County 
denied Young's request by stating that access to the records he requested were precluded 
by Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. R. 74. On March 28, 2000, Young administratively 
appealed the denial. R. 76. On April 20, 2000, the County responded to the appeal denying 
it in part and granting it in part. R. 80. In denying the request, the County maintained that 
the requested records were classified as "protected" and therefore could not be released. R. 
81-82. Further, the County contended that the requested records were also restricted by Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. R. 82. On May 16, 2000, twenty six (26) days later, Young filed a 
petition in the Third Judicial District Court seeking judicial review of the County's denial 
of his request. R. 1. 
On September 19,2000, the district court heard oral arguments on cross-motions for 
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summary judgment. R. 184. Young argued that the records were needed to compare them to 
his case in order to review the consistency and proportionality of his discipline. T. 2. Young 
specifically argued that he was only interested in adjudicated cases where the discipline was 
sustained, and only needed the information about the conduct and the discipline not any 
private information about a particular party. T. 3-4, 7. The County argued that their 
classification of the requested records as "protected" was proper under GRAMA. T. 17-18. 
In support of their argument, they cited the privacy concerns, both personal and professional, 
of individuals referred to in the records. T. 18-19,22-23. The County did not raise any issue 
about the burden of complying with the request. T. 16-29. The County also argued that it 
was premature to consider whether Young's due process rights were violated because the 
Merit Commission hearing had not occurred. T. 20-23. After considering oral arguments 
from counsel, the court granted Young's motion and denied the County's. T. 45. 
In granting Young's motion, the court did not rule that Young's due process rights 
were violated, but rather that he had a due process interest in acquiring the records for his 
administrative hearing challenging his termination because they were relevant to the 
proceedings. R. 168. The court therefore ordered that Young was entitled to records of 
other deputies relating to disciplinary charges and the resulting discipline that was imposed. 
T. 46. However, the court accepted the concerns raised by the County regarding the private 
information that may be contained in the records and ordered any private information to be 
redacted. T. 46. 
During the Merit Commission proceedings, Young has involved the Merit 
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Commission in his request for the records. R. 68 and 162. The Merit Commission has agreed 
to Young's use of GRAMA to pursue the records and has agreed to continue the proceedings 
until this matter is resolved. R. 68. As the County notes in their brief, addendum D, the 
Merit Commission has recently ruled on its review of the records provided by the County. 
However, the Merit Commission has not yet ruled on Young's response to their decision. 
Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Young's petition for judicial review of the County's denial of his GRAMA appeal 
was timely filed under the plain meaning of the statute. The County's argument to the 
contrary defies the plain meaning of the statute and the authority upon which they rely is 
misplaced. 
The records Young requested are public records by statutory definition. Because 
they are public records Young is entitled to copies of the records he requested. The 
County's arguments that the records are protected records or otherwise restricted by 
statute are not persuasive because the requested records do no meet the statutory 
classification of protected records and the statute upon which the County relies to argue 
that access to the records is precluded is not applicable. 
Finally, even if the records are protected, the district court followed the statutory 
requirements to order their release. The intent of GRAMA is not to preclude access, but 
rather to restrict. To achieving its intent, GRAMA provides a statutory framework within 
which restricted records may be accessed and released upon compliance with the statute. 
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The district court followed the statutory framework by having jurisdiction over the 
controversy, considered the appropriate interest in the records, properly balanced those 
interests, placed restrictions on the records where appropriate and found sound authority 
independent of GRAMA to order the release. The County's arguments that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction and improperly relied on due process principles for 
authority to order the release are without merit. The requested records are subject to 
GRAMA thereby giving the district court jurisdiction to review Young's petition and the 
County's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 to contend that the district court needed 
authority independent of GRAMA to order release is in error because it does not apply to 
the records. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
YOUNG TIMELY FILED HIS PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE. 
Young filed his petition for judicial review twenty six (26) days after the county 
responded to his request. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i) requires a petition for 
judicial review to be filed within thirty (30) days after a response. Nevertheless, the 
County argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Young's petition for 
judicial review of their denial of his GRAMA request because he failed to timely file his 
petition. The County's argument relies on a couple of statutes. First, the County argues 
that because they did not respond to Young's request within five (5) days after it was 
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filed Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b) causes their failure to respond to be treated as a 
denial of the request. The County then equates the denial with a complete failure to 
respond and argues that because they failed to respond, albeit within the five (5) days of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(5)(b), Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) applies and 
provides Young with thirty five (35) days in which to file his petition for judicial review 
from the date he filed his request. The County concludes that since Young failed to file 
his petition within thirty five (35) days his petition is therefore untimely. The County's 
argument is not cogent because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and the 
authority upon which they rely is misplaced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2) provides: 
(a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a 
governmental entity's determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402(l)(b). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request 
by either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or 
in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to 
respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-40l(l)(b) occur; 
and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination 
under Section 63-2-401. 
In interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404, the well established rules of statutory 
interpretation apply. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). 
The rules provide that you first look to the plain language of the statute to give effect to its 
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meaning and intent. Id. Only if the statute's language is ambiguous, do you look beyond the 
statute to determine the statute's meaning. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000). When 
the language of a statute "is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 377, 380 
(1921). 
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 is clear and unambiguous. 
Subsection(2)(b)(i) plainly states that a party has thirty (30) days after the governmental 
entity has responded to the GRAMA request to file a petition for judicial review. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i). Young filed his GRAMA administrative appeal request with the 
County on March 28, 2000. R. 76. Twenty three (23) days later in a correspondence dated 
April 20, 2000, the County responded to the request by denying it in part and by granting 
it in part. R. 16., 167. On May 16, 2000, twenty six (26) days after the County responded, 
Young filed his petition for judicial review. Accordingly, Young's petition for judicial 
review filed twenty six (26) days after the County's response is within the thirty (30) days 
clearly provided for by Utah Code Ann. 63-2-404(2)(b)(i). See also, Graham v. Davis Co. 
Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, 367 (Ut. App. 1999)(opinion notes 30 day period 
to petition for judicial review following governmental entity's response to the request.). 
Despite the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i), the County 
nevertheless argues that Young's petition was filed untimely. The County's premises its 
argument on Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-401(5)(b) to argue that it required the chief 
administrative officer to "respond" to Young's request within five (5) days and because there 
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was no response within five days the failure was a denial of the request. The County's 
interest is to obviously equate their failure to act within five (5) days with a complete failure 
to respond v/hich would cause the thirty five (35) day period of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
404(2)(b)(ii) to apply. However, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-401 (5)(b) makes no mention of a 
"response" to an appeal. Rather, it requires the chief administrative office to make a 
"determination" on the appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b). While the County's 
argument seeks to equate the two verbs, their argument is not supported by GRAMA. 
A brief review of the GRAMA statutes demonstrate that the word "determination", 
as contemplated by GRAMA, concerns what classification the governmental entity places 
the requested records in, not the response to the request. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-
103(7), 63-2-401 and 63-2-404. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(3) makes the 
distinction between the words "determination" and "response" evident by its use of each 
word differently. Finally, a common sense reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b) 
defies the County's argument since a five (5) day window for a governmental entity to 
"respond" to a GRAMA request is an unreasonably short amount of time. The amount of 
time for mail service of the response alone may exceed five (5) days. Accordingly, the 
County's argument that Young's period to file his petition started five (5) days after he made 
his request is without merit because the statute relied upon by the County concerns a failure 
to make a determination and not a response. 
Moreover, the County's argument completely disregards the fact that they did respond 
to Young's request. That fact is significant for two reasons. First, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
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404(2)(b)(ii) provides for a 35 day period to petition for judicial review only when the 
"governmental entity failed to respond to the request." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
404.(Emphasis added). Because the County responded to Young's request, the County's 
argument that Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) applies is not accurate. Secondly, the 
County's response was made on April 20, 2000, 23 days after Young submitted his request 
on March 28, 2000. Thus, the County responded to Young's request within the 35 days 
Young would have had to file his petition if the County did not respond. Because the County 
responded, particularly because they did so within the 35 days, the 35 day period 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) would no longer apply, and instead, 
the 30 day period of Utah Code Ann. 63-2-404(2)(b)(i) would apply. Thus, the fact that the 
County responded to Young's GRAMA request makes their argument that his petition was 
untimely filed unpersuasive and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. 
II. 
BECAUSE THE RECORDS YOUNG REQUESTED ARE 
PUBLIC RECORDS, THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THOSE RECORDS. 
The records Young requested are public records by definition under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-30 l(2)(o). If government records are defined as public records under 
GRAMA, access is not restricted. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-201(1). On the other hand, if 
the requested records are properly classified by the governmental entity as private, 
protected or controlled, access is restricted and permitted only pursuant to GRAMA. The 
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County classified the records Young requested as "protected" and therefore contends that 
Young is precluded from access. However, when the records Young requested are 
analyzed under GRAMA, it is clear that the records are "public" and not "protected", as 
Young argued in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-30l(2)(o) provides: 
The following records are normally public, but to the extent that a record is expressly 
exempt from disclosure, access may be restricted under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b), 
Section 63-2-302, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304: 
(o) records that would disclose information relating to formal charges or disciplinary 
actions against a past or present governmental entity employee if: (i) the disciplinary 
action has been completed and all time periods for administrative appeal have 
expired; and (ii) the charges on which the disciplinary actions was based were 
sustained. 
Young requested copies of records of disciplinary investigations of any member of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department that involved either the improper use of a 
firearm or inappropriate sexual misconduct, either physical or verbal. R. 76. The records 
Young requested clearly fall within the records contemplated by subsection (o) of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2). Further, Young made clear that he only needed the records for 
comparison purposes and that only investigatory and disciplinary records of conduct 
similar to his where the disciplinary proceedings were completed and the discipline was 
imposed were needed. T. 3 and 7. Accordingly, the records Young was requesting also 
satisfies the conditional requirements of subsection (o) that the appeal on any such 
disciplinary actions had expired and the discipline was sustained. 
Even though the records Young requested fit the public record definition of Utah 
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Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2), the statute nevertheless allows access to be restricted under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-201(3)(b) and 63-2-204. The County has indeed sought to 
prevent Young's access by invoking those statutes. However, the records Young 
requested do not fit under those statutes thereby causing the records to remain public 
subject to access. 
The County argued that the records were "protected records" under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-304(9), (11) and (12). R. 96. The following records are protected if properly 
classified under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9), (11) and (12): 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal or administrative 
enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for discipline, licensing, 
certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records: 
a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations, undertaken 
for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes; 
b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or 
enforcement proceedings; 
c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or 
impartial hearing; 
d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source who is 
not generally known outside of government and, in case of a record 
complied in the course of an investigation, disclose information furnished 
by a source not generally known outside government if disclosure would 
compromise the source; or 
e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit 
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known outside 
government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit efforts. 
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security of 
governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental record-
keeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation or use contrary 
to law or public policy; 
(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security or safety of a 
correctional facility, or records relating to incarceration, treatment, 
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probation, or parole, that would interfere with the control and supervision 
of an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole; 
Clearly the records Young requested do not even arguably fall within subsections 
(11) and (12). The records have nothing to do with governmental programs or property 
or of a correctional facility. Subsection (9) is the only one that would even arguably 
apply. However, an analysis of the requested records demonstrates that the County's 
classification is incorrect. 
First, the request sought records of disciplinary cases comparable to Young's 
where the investigation and the discipline imposed have been adjudicated. Because the 
request sought records on adjudicated cases, subsections (a) and (b) would not apply 
because the matter would have been adjudicated and the disclosure thereof could not 
reasonably be expected to interfere with disciplinary investigations or proceedings. 
Second, subsection (c) of the statute would not apply for fundamentally the same reasons. 
Because the request sought adjudicated records, the disclosure of the records could not 
create a danger of depriving a person of a fair or impartial hearing or trial. Ironically, it is 
the non-disclosure of the records that would create a danger of depriving Young a fair 
hearing because he would be denied information relevant to his administrative 
proceedings and necessary for his case. Third, subsections (d) and (e) do not apply 
simply because the concerns raised in those subsections do not exist in the records 
requested. The request was for disciplinary records, not records on confidential 
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informants or techniques.1 
The County's other contention that Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-20l(3)(b) applies by 
virtue of the restriction on the records through Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is equally 
without merit. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does not apply to the records requested, and 
even if it did, it certainly does not apply to all of the records. Utah Code Ann. § 17-13-
19 applies only to the Merit Commission and by its plain language only restricts release 
of the "written charges" filed with the Merit Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. 
Young's request was filed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department, not the Merit 
Commission, and his request did not seek copies of the written charges filed with the 
Merit Commission. Moreover, only certain major employment actions such as demotion, 
reduction in pay, suspension or discharge require Merit Commission involvement. Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Thus, disciplinary investigations that did not result in any major 
employment action would not even be covered by Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Indeed, 
those are the records that would be most beneficial to Young. If the conduct investigated 
was similar to Young's but did not result in major employment action, then the records 
would be extremely probative because they would suggest that Young's major 
employment action, dismissal, was not consistent or proportional. 
The records Young requested are public records under GRAMA, specifically Utah 
1
 At the hearing before the district court the County made arguments to protect internal 
affairs' files asserting that they are "protected" under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9). The 
general basis for the County's arguments to restrict access have previously been considered and 
rejected by this Court in Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 801 P.2d 912 (Utah 1990). 
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Code Ann. § 63-2-30l(2)(o). The County's argument that they are restricted records 
because they classified them as protected records or because they are restricted under 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is not persuasive because those statutes do not apply to the 
records requested. Therefore, because the records Young requested are public records, 
the district court properly ordered their release to Young. 
III. 
EVEN IF THE RECORDS WERE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS PROTECTED, 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENT TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF A PROTECTED RECORD. 
The district court complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7) that provides a 
court with authority to order the release of a protected record. The County argues that the 
district court's order was improper, however, because it lacked jurisdiction and because 
the court did not find proper authority to overcome the restriction of Utah Code Ann. § 
17-30-19 on the release of the records. The County's arguments are contrary to the 
codified intent of GRAMA, presents an unreasonable and unworkable interpretation of 
GRAMA based on construction and policy grounds and misinterprets the application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. 
A. The district court had jurisdiction to order the release of the records. 
Because the records Young requested are governmental records, the district court 
had jurisdiction to consider his petition to review a GRAMA denial. However, the 
County argues that GRAMA should be interpreted to read that the only way for a court to 
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have jurisdiction to order the release of protected records is if the party requesting the 
records also has a current action before the same court for which the records are needed. 
If there is no underlying action before the same court, the County maintains that its 
classification of a record as protected is absolute and access is precluded, period. See, 
Appellant's brief, p. 15, f^ 3. The County therefore argues that because Young's 
underlying action is before an administrative body and not the district court, the district 
court had no jurisdiction to review his petition for judicial review and Young is therefore 
precluded from accessing the records. 
Unlike many statutes, GRAMA codified its legislative intent. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-102. Its intent is clearly not to preclude access to restricted government records, 
but rather to adopt a procedure to restrict access where appropriate to protect certain 
interest by balancing the need for access against the need to restrict access to the records. 
Id. See also, Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, 371 (Ut. 
App. 1999). Indeed, GRAMA specifically "favors public access when, in the application 
of this act [GRAMA], countervailing interests are of equal weight." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-1-102(e). 
To achieve its intent, GRAMA provides sections that allow for the release of 
protected records upon compliance with the statutory requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-202. Provided within that section is a subsection that provides for the release of 
protected records upon court order. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7). Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-202(7) requires a governmental entity to release protected records pursuant to a 
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court order provided the court has jurisdiction over the matter, considers the interests 
favoring access against the interest to restrict access and finds the balance in favor of 
access and, where access to the records are restricted elsewhere, the court has authority 
independent of GRAMA to release the records. Id. 
The district court's order complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7) in all 
respects. The district court considered Young's need for access against the County's 
interest in restricting access. T. 45 and 46. In considering the competing interest of the 
parties, the court implicitly found that Young's interest in accessing the information 
requested outweighed the County's interest in precluding access. R. 168. However, 
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7), the court considered any privacy interest 
that may be contained in the records and restricted access to any private information 
contained therein by ordering the redaction of not only personal identities, but any 
information that would lead to the discovery of identities. R. 169. Further, the court 
provided for an in-camera review should disputes remain between the parties regarding a 
particular record. R. 169. 
The County argues, however, that the district court did not meet the jurisdictional 
requirement under the first subsection of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202 and therefore it 
could not even review their denial of Young's GRAMA request. The County appeals to 
this Court to read Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a) which provides: "the record deals 
with a matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction;" to mean that before a 
court can order release of a protected or any other restricted record, the party requesting 
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record must have first filed an action for which the records are needed before the same 
court. Because Young's need for the records is for his matter before the Merit 
Commission and not before the district court, the County argues that the district court had 
no jurisdiction to consider his petition for review. As a consequence, the County argues 
that their classification of the records as "protected" not only restrict, but completely 
precludes access. 
Not only is the County's argument contrary to the intent of GRAMA and without a 
basis in law, it is also an exceedingly myopic and unworkable approach to interpreting 
GRAMA and would promote poor judicial policy. Under the County's argument the only 
way a party could seek judicial review of their denial to a request for a protected record is 
if the need for the protected record is for an action pending before the same court. The 
County's approach would preclude parties in an action in federal court from petitioning 
for judicial review of a denial of their request for state protected records since the federal 
court would have no jurisdiction to review a denial of a request under state GRAMA. 
The County's approach would preclude parties in need of information not for a legal 
action but for other purposes from requesting judicial review of the denial. The County's 
argument would promote poor judicial policy by forcing parties who are still evaluating 
whether they have a viable cause of action to file an action prematurely just to obtain 
records to determine whether they have a cause of action. Lastly, it would preclude 
parties, like Young, from obtaining judicial review of a governmental entity's denial of a 
GRAMA request made for records necessary in an administrative hearing. A review of 
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Young's situation aptly demonstrates how unworkable the County's interpretation is. 
One of two issues in Young's administrative hearing is whether the discipline 
imposed upon him was warranted. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm., 8 P.3d 
1048, 1052 (Ut App. 2000). The issue presents the question of whether the discipline 
was excessive or disproportionate. See, Lucas v. Murray City Civ. Serv. Comm fn, 949 
P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997). In answering the question, Lucas demonstrates that the 
inquiry involves a comparison to similar cases and the discipline imposed in those cases . 
Id. at 762. Clearly, the issues facing Young require that he be provided with the records 
he requested to develop his case because they are needed to demonstrate that his 
discipline was not consistent or proportional in comparison to similar cases. In that 
regard, GRAMA's intent to "prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by 
permitting confidential treatment of records only as provided by this chapter (GRAMA);" 
is completely consistent with providing Young access to the records he requested. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-102(3)(c). Despite the relevancy of the records Young requested, and 
the legitimate basis for his request, the County's argument would preclude Young from 
seeking the access to the records thereby denying him records clearly relevant and 
material to his case. 
Additionally, the County argues that Young's request is not ripe for judicial 
review because he is still before the Merit Commission. That argument is equally 
unworkable not only because it is a misapplication of the ripeness doctrine, but because it 
also contemplates a "catch-22" situation. The ripeness doctrine concerns a judicial policy 
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of not addressing issues which have not yet materialized to prevent the court from issuing 
advisory opinions. See, State v. Ortiz, 987 P.2d 39 (Utah 1999). Given the issues facing 
Young at his hearing, the issue and need for the records is ripe. The County's arguments 
at the district court hearing suggest that they are confusing Young's due process interest 
in acquiring the records with the "ripeness" of whether his due process rights would be 
violated at the Merit Commission hearing. T. 23. Young has never asserted his due 
process rights were violated. Rather, he asserted that he has a due process interest in 
acquiring the records. The County's argument, however, would first require Young to 
go through the administrative proceeding without the benefit of the records before he can 
petition for judicial review of the denial of his records request. But because any judicial 
review of the administrative proceeding is limited to a "review of the record", even if 
Young prevailed in gaining access to the records he requested during the review, the 
administrative hearing will have already occurred mooting his request for the records. 
See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Ut. App. 1991). In essence, 
the County argues that Young could not petition for judicial review of a GRAMA denial 
before an administrative hearing because no court would have jurisdiction to hear the 
petition, but the law says that if Young petitions for judicial review after the 
administrative hearing the petition would be moot because the court's review would be 
limited to the record of the administrative proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a) must be read in a manner consistent with its 
plain meaning. What the statute clearly contemplates is that the requested records must 
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be government records subject to GRAMA thereby "dealing with a matter in controversy 
over which the court has jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a). Accepting the 
County's argument, would preclude, not simply restrict access to government records by 
preventing a party from even seeking judicial review of a governmental entity's decision 
to restrict records. The County's argument is contrary to the intent, spirit and plain 
meaning of GRAMA, and contrary to the specific objective of GRAMA to "prevent abuse 
of confidentiality by governmental entities." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(3)(c). 
B. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 does not apply to Young's request. 
The County also argues that GRAMA under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(7)(e) 
requires a court to find authority independent of GRAMA where another statute restrict 
the release of the requested records. The County again relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 17-
30-19 as the other statute that it maintains restricts the requested records to argue the 
district court must therefore find authority independent of GRAMA to order the release. 
The County ultimately contends that the district court's order was in error because its 
reliance on Young's due process right to the records was insufficient and that the statute 
requires independent "statutory authority" to order the release. Appellant's brief, p. 20, 
^ 1. Beyond the fact that the statute's language does not support the County's argument 
that independent "statutory" must exist to order release, the County's argument is without 
merit because Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does not apply to the records requested, and 
even if it does apply, it would not apply to all the records. Finally, even if it applies to all 
the records requested, the district court found proper authority independent of GRAMA 
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to order release. 
Young requested records from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department 
"concerning any investigation of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Department where the conduct investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling 
of a firearm or inappropriate sexual conduct, both verbal or physical." R. 167. The 
County seeks to manipulate the records requested to mean that the requested records are 
records filed with the Merit Commission. Their objective is obvious. By so manipulating 
the request, they are able to invoke Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 restriction on the release 
of the records. As previously argued, however, the records Young requested do not fall 
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. 
First, Young's request was to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department, not the 
Merit Commission. Second, the request was for records concerning the investigation of 
any sworn member of the Department. The request was not limited to the "written 
charges" filed with the Merit Commission which are the only records covered by the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does 
not apply to the records Young requested. 
The application of Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is also limited. Only written 
charges resulting in demotion, reduction in pay, suspension, or discharge are restricted 
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19(1). Disciplinary investigations where the discipline 
imposed did not involve any of the four above disciplines would not be subject to Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Accordingly, even if Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 applies, it 
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would not apply to any cases involving conduct similar to which Young was charged 
where the discipline did not meet the statutory requirement. 
Assuming, however, that Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does apply in whole, the 
district court properly applied Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(e). The district court found 
that Young had a due process right to the requested records, but with restrictions on the 
private information contained therein, reasoning that Young was entitled to the records to 
assist in his appeal before the Merit Commission. The district court's reasoning is well 
founded. 
Since Young was a merit employee with the County, his termination was subject 
to appeal before the Merit Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. While Young's 
post-termination proceedings before the Merit Commission are not based on a 
"constitutional guarantee", the proceedings must nevertheless "comport with due process 
requirements providing for a fair hearing." Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm yn, 949 
P.2d 746, 753 (Ut. App. 1997). There are two issues before the Merit Commission in 
reviewing the County's discipline of Young. Id. The second of the two issues concerns 
the proportionality of the discipline imposed on Young. Id. at 758. It requires a 
consideration of the consistency of the discipline which is evaluated by, among other 
factors, comparing the discipline to that imposed on other employees for similar conduct.2 
2
 The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department maintains a policy similar to, if not exact 
like, the policy examined in Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm % 949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997). 
R. 150. 
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Id. at 762. The records Young requested concerned the discipline imposed on other 
deputies for similar conduct which he clearly needs to fairly address the second issue and 
develop his case. Without the records Young would be precluded from challenging his 
discipline and would allow the County to maintain a secrecy of the evidence that may be 
relevant to the consistency of the discipline they imposed. At a minimum, denying 
Young access to the relevant records he requested fails to comport with due process 
requirements, and would create the "appearance of unfairness" from which a reasonable 
person would find the hearing unfair; which due process does not tolerate. Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Ut. App. 1991). 
Moreover, under the recent case ofKelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Co mm 'n, 8. P.3d 
1048 (Ut. App. 2000) Young will have the specific burden of demonstrating the disparity 
of his discipline by comparing it to similarly situated employees.3 Id. at 1056. In meeting 
his burden, Young must "point to specific instances or statistics, rather than relying on an 
unsupported assertion of inconsistent punishments." Id. With that burden, Young must 
have access to the records of "similarly situated employees" to present his case. Denying 
Young the records, which are exclusively within the control of the County, would prevent 
Young from even being able to present a case and assure his defeat before the hearing 
even starts. That would render the entire hearing process meaningless thereby running 
3
 As in Lucas, the decision in Kelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 8. P.3d 1048 (Ut. 
App. 1997) relies upon a department policy similar to that which will be applicable in Young's 
Merit Commission proceedings. R. 150. 
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afoul of due process. The district court's reliance on due process principles as the 
authority to order the disclosure of the records Young requested is therefore sound and 
provided competent authority independent GRAMA to order the County to comply with 
Young's requests. 
Even if the County properly classified the records as protected, the district court 
properly complied with GRAMA in ordering the release of the records. The court 
properly had jurisdiction, considered the competing interest in the records and protected 
any private information in ordering the release and the court found competent 
independent authority to order the release to the extent the records were restricted by 
another statute. 
IV. 
YOUNG SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES 
BECAUSE THE COUNTY'S APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a), this Court may assess damages for 
appeals that are frivolous or taken for delay. U.R.App.P 33(a). A frivolous appeal is an 
appeal "that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." U.R.App.P. 33(b). 
The County's appeal is frivolous for two fundamental reasons: 1) the arguments 
that they present are contrary to the plain language of the statutes upon which they rely 
and 2) their arguments interpreting the statutes are contrary to the intent of the statutes 
therefore not warranted by existing law or based on a good faith argument to extend, 
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modify or reverse existing law. 
Moreover, the fundamental concern the County has always maintained in releasing 
the records is the "private nature" of the records, noting the personal private information 
that the records may contain. T. 18,19,22,23. The summary judgment order, however, 
redacted any personal information and Young was never requesting any personal 
information. Nevertheless the County filed the appeal and continues to maintain their 
concern over the release of personal information. Appellant's brief, p.21. The County's 
continued concern despite it being adequately addressed in the order raises concern over 
the County's interest in the delay caused by the appeal. The delay would certainly work 
to the County's benefit on many levels including the cost of litigation for Young, a 
former governmental employee. Because the summary judgment order addressed the 
County's concerns, their interest in pursuing this appeal warrants a finding that it is being 
taken for delay giving reason for the assessment of damages. 
Accordingly, Young respectfully requests that he be awarded damages against the 
County for pursuing this appeal because it was frivolous and pursued to cause delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Young requested records from the County that was limited to only those records 
he needed to develop his case in an administrative proceeding. The records he requested 
are public records by statutory definition. The County's argument to the contrary is not 
supported by the statute. Assuming, however, that the records requested are protected 
records, the district court properly complied with the statutory requirement necessary for 
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the release of protected records. Based upon the foregoing, Young respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the summary judgment order of the district court, and award 
damages to Young against the County. 
DATED this ^ A ( day of September, 2001. 
$AKAmSKY& NYKAMP 
Braked Makamura 
Attorney fw Plaintiff/Appellee 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this the _ day of 
September, 2001: 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
VALERIE M. WILDE 
Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
'(ibid*-
Addendum A 
BLAKE NAKAMURA, USB #6288 
NAKAMURA &' NYKAMP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
142 East 200 South, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)530-1541 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S MERIT SERVICE COMMISSION 
ooOoo 
BRENT YOUNG, ) RESPONSE TO DECISION ON 
) IN CAMERA REVIEW OF 
Appellant, ) COMPARABLE CASES 
vs. ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S ) No. 00-1 
DEPARTMENT ) 
Respondent. ) 
ooOoo 
COMES now the Appellant, Brent Young, by and through his 
counsel, Blake Nakamura, and hereby responds to the Commission's 
decision to not release copies of any disciplinary cases to Mr. 
Young. Mr. Young responds by providing several cases for the 
Commission's review to determine if they were disclosed by the 
Respondent. Mr. Young so responds because his own investigation 
has revealed casesr some of which are clearly similar to the 
conduct charged in Mr. Young's case and, therefore, should have 
been disclosed. Because the Commission's review relied solely 
upon the disclosure by the Respondent, Mr. Young provides the 
Commission the following cases for further review to ensure the 
thoroughness of the Respondent's disclosures. 
1 
For the purpose of comparison, Mr. Young was disciplined for 
exercising poor judgement in his choice of words that he used in 
communicating wirh an 8 year old female and used the words in a 
uquid pro quo" phrase. Mr. Young was nor disciplined for acting 
with any ill intent. Based upon those grounds for Mr. Young's 
discipline, the following cases are identified for further 
comparison: 
1. Deputy Mike Kimball 
Deputy Kimball was an instructor at Judge Memorial High 
School. In that capacity, Deputy Kimball developed an intimate 
relationship with a female student. The relationship was 
apparently discovered and reported to the Department. Deputy 
Kimball was investigated for misconduct and given minor 
discipline. After being disciplined, and contrary to his 
discipline, Deputy Kimball resumed the relationship with the 
female student. The relationship was again disclosed and Deputy 
Kimball was again disciplined. The actions of Deputy Kimball 
demonstrate poor judgement. However, despite even being 
discipline previously, Deputy Kimball was not terminated and 
continues tc be employed as a Deputy Sheriff. 
2. Mark Neilson or Nelson: 
Deputy Neilson was a high school resource officer. In that 
capacity, he developed an intimate relationship with a female 
student. To conceal the relationship, Deputy Neilson apparently 
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solicited Deputy Lonnie Wilson to purchase gifts on his behalf 
for the female student. The relationship was disclosed and 
Deputy Neilson was disciplined. The actions of Deputy Meilson 
demonstrate poor judgement. Deputy Neilson, however, continues 
to be employed as a Deputy Sheriff. 
3. Sergeant Bob Petersen: 
In early 2000, it is understood that an allegation of some 
form of child abuse was reported against Sergeant Petersen. The 
child was apparently a grandchild. The matter was investigated 
and Sergeant Petersen was placed on administrative leave. It is 
unknown what discipline he received. 
4. Deputy Sampson: 
It is believed that Deputy Sampson is now a Lieutenant. 
When he was a Sergeant, he apparently developed an intimate 
.relationship with a female subordinate. The relationship was 
apparently determined to be inappropriate by the Department and 
Sampson was disciplined. It is believed that Sampson received 30 
days off without pay as his discipline. The actions of Sergeant 
Sampson demonstrates poor judgement, however, he remains employed 
and even apparently received a promotion to Lieutenant. 
In the event, the above cases were disclosed to the 
Commission for review, Mr. Young alternatively moves the 
Commission to reconsider whether the conduct described in cases 
provided by the Respondent are similar to the conduct alleged 
against Mr. Young and, therefore, meriting disclosure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of August 2001 
Blake Nakamura 
Attorney forNAppellant, 
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John T. Morgan, Bar No. 3839 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for the Chapter 7 Trustee 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
—oooOooo— 
In re: 
DMG COLOR, INC., 
Debtor(s). 
—oooOooo— 
TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
APPROVING SALE OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
Roger G. Segal, Chapter 7 Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of the above named debtor 
pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §363(b) and Rule 6004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure moves the Court for an order authorizing and approving the sale of certain personal 
property of the estate. In support of said Motion, the Trustee represents to the Court as follows: 
1. The Debtor filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on 
July 27, 1994. Said case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on 
November 30,1995. Roger G. Segal was appointed as permanent Trustee of the Debtor's estate 
on January 16,1996. 
2. Included in the bankruptcy estate of the above named Debtor are claims and 
potential causes of action, including but not limited to claims against Dick Warner, a former principal 
of the Debtor, for alleged misappropriation of the Debtor's business, goodwill and customer base. 
H i . 
* « 
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(Chapter 7) 
3. The Trustee has received an offer from Rick H. Warner to purchase the claims and 
potential causes of action of the Debtor from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of DMG Color, Inc. 
("the property") for the sum of $2,000.00. The sale is subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, subject 
to higher and better offers. 
4. The Trustee makes no representation as to the value or legal sufficiency of any such 
claims or potential causes of action. The Trustee has determined that it is in the best interest of the 
estate and its creditors to sell the property to Rick H. Warner rather than to pursue those claims 
himself on behalf of the estate. In the event the Trustee is unable to sell the property, he intends 
to abandon the estate's interest in the property as burdensome to the estate. In the opinion of the 
Trustee the value of the property to the estate is not sufficient, after considering Chapter 7 
administrative costs and unpaid Chapter 11 administrative expenses, to produce a benefit to 
unsecured creditors if pursued through litigation by the Trustee. 
5. Persons desiring to submit higher and better offers should do so by submitting them 
in writing to the Trustee's counsel, John T. Morgan of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C., 525 East 
First South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 to be actually received by no later than 
Wednesday, January 7,1998. Offers must be free of contingency, must provide for payment of not 
less than $2,500.00, and shall otherwise be on the same terms as the Trustee's proposed sale to 
Rick Warner or on terms which, in the Trustee's sole opinion, are more favorable to the Debtor's 
estate. Offers must provide for a closing within twenty four (24) hours of the Bankruptcy Court 
approval of the Motion. 
6. In the event that competing offers for the property are received, the Trustee shall 
arrange for an auction sale to be held among Rick H. Warner and any competing offeror who has 
submitted an offer in accordance with paragraph 5 with not less than twenty four (24) hours notice 
of the time and place of the auction sale. The opening bid at the auction sale shall be $200.00 
higher than the highest offer submitted for the property and the Trustee will accept bids in 
increments of not less than $100.00 until the highest bid is received. At the time of the hearing 
before the Bankruptcy Court on this Motion, the Trustee will advise the Court with respect to the 
highest offer which he has received and will request that the sale of the property to the offeror who 
has made the highest and best offer be approved. The Trustee may in his sole discretion accept 
a backup offer, and seek Court approval for, the second highest bid submitted for the property. In 
the event that the highest bidder fails to close the purchase of the property in a timely manner, the 
Trustee may sell the property pursuant to the backup offer. 
WHEREFORE the Trustee prays that the Court enter an Order providing as follows: 
1. Approving the sale of the property to Rick H. Warner pursuant to the terms set forth 
herein, or to the person who has submitted the highest and best offer pursuant to the terms of 
paragraphs 5 and 6; and, 
2. Authorizing the Trustee to take all steps necessary to complete and close the sale 
of the property; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this day of December, 1997. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
J^ohn T. Morgan 
Attorneys for the Trustee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ay of December, 1997 a true and 
accurate copy of the foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the United 
States mail, to all creditors listed on the official mailing matrix, attached hereto, and specifically to: 
United States Trustee 
Suite 100, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DMG Color, Inc. 
3473 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Rick H. Warner 
c/o James G. Swensen 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dick Warner and Vickie Lynn Warner 
1657 East Haven Glen Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Steven W. Call 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Randall Call 
Sally B. McMinimee 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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John T. Morgan, Bar No. 3839 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for the Chapter 7 Trustee 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
—oooOooo— 
In re: 
DMG COLOR, INC., 
Debtor(s). 
—oooOooo— 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S INTENT TO SELL PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING 
SALE OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
TO ALL CREDITORS OF THE DEBTORS AND OTHER PARTIES IN INTEREST APPEARING ON 
THE DEBTOR'S MAILING MATRIX: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rules 2002 and 6004 of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, Roger G. Segal the duly appointed, qualified and acting Chapter 7 Trustee 
of the above captioned bankruptcy estate hereby gives notice that he intends to sell the bankruptcy 
estate's right, title and interest in certain personal property (hereinafter "the property") consisting of 
claims and potential causes of action of the Debtor for alleged. 
DOCKEr 
CONTROL 
Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721 
(Chapter 7) 
Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Personal Property of the Estate 
and Notice of Hearing 
Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /b day of December, 1997 a true a 
accurate copy of the foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the Unit 
States mail, to all creditors listed on the official mailing matrix, attached hereto, and specifically i 
United States Trustee 
Suite 100, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DMG Color, Inc. 
3473 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Rick H. Warner 
c/o James G Swensen 
Corbridge, Baird & Chnstensen 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dick Warner and Vickie Lynn Warner 
1657 East Haven Glen Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Steven W. Call 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Randall Call 
Sally B. McMinimee 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 _ 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I 
f:\mar3ha\jtmVJmg noh 
Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Personal Property of the Estate 
and Notice of Hearing 
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Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721 
(Chapter 7) 
PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY: / W ^ 9 / / # / / 
John T. Morgan, Esq. ^ * * * " " ^ ^ ^ / 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ / ? 
P.O. Box 11008 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Chapter 7 Trustee 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
—oooOooo— 
In re: 
DMG COLOR, INC., 
Debtor(s). 
—oooOooo— 
ORDER AUTHORIZING SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
A hearing was held on January 12, 1998 concerning the Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Sale 
of Property of the Estate. John T. Morgan of the law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. appeared on 
behalf of the Trustee, Roger G. Segal, and other appearances, if any, were noted on the record. 
At the hearing, counsel for the Trustee advised the Court that an auction sale was held January 7,1998 
between Rick H. Warner and Dick Warner, the two individuals who had presented competing offers to the 
Trustee for the property. At the auction the highest bid was received from Dick Warner and his bid of 
$4,500.00 was accepted by the Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Trustee's Motion and subject to the approval 
of the Court. 
Based upon the finding that notice of the intended sale was properly given to all creditors and parties 
in interest and upon the failure of any party in interest to appear or otherwise object to the sale, and the Court 
having found that the proposed sale is in the best interest of the estate and its creditors and for good cause 
Order Authorizing Sale of Personal Property 
January 12,1998 
Page l o f 3 
shown, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to sell the claims and potential causes of 
action of the Debtor from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of DMG Color, Inc. without warranty (the "property") 
to Dick Warner for the sum of $4,500.00 pursuant to the terms set forth in the Motion dated December 18, 
1997; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to take all steps necessary to complete 
and close the sale of the property; and, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to close the sale of the property pursuant 
to the backup offer in the event Dick Warner fails to close the purchase as required under the terms of the 
Trustee's Motion. 
DATED this / < * day of January, 1998. 
^J^/&^^ 
JohMI. Allen 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the l^xday of January, 1998 a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing Order was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, to: 
Roger G. Segal, Trustee Steven W. Call 
P. O. Box 11008 Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 79 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John T. Morgan, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. Rick H. Warner 
Attorneys for Trustee c/o James G. Swenson 
P. O. Box 11008 Corbridge, Baird & Christensen 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
United States Trustee 
Suite 100, Boston Building v 
9 Exchange Place 0*0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(f \amy\jtm\DMG ord) 
Order Authorizing Sale of Personal Property 
January 12, 1998 
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
IN RE 
DMG Color, Inc. 
Debtor(s). 
NO. 94 - 23721 JHA 
Chapter 7 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL: 
John T. Morgan (Trustee) 
Proceedings were held on January 12, 1998. 
DOCKET ENTRY: 
Minute Entry Re: [83-1] Notice of Intent to Sell by Roger G. Segal. (JHA;HH;KM; 3 min) 
$4,500 sale to Dick Warner approved if time limit is complied with; otherwise, backup offer is 
approved. Order executed. 
BILL OF SALE 
KNOW ALL PEOPLE BY THIS BILL OF SALE that Roger G. Segal, Trustee of the 
Bankruptcy Estate of DMG Color, Inc., Debtor, Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721 (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Seller"), pursuant to an Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah entered January 13,1998, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", for the sum of 
Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, has bargained, sold, assignedand 
transferred and by this Bill of Sale does hereby sell, assign and transfer unto Digital Media Group 
all of the bankruptcy estate's interest in claims and potential causes of action of the Debtor, 
including but not limited to claims against Dick Warner for alleged misappropriation of the 
Debtor's business, goodwill and customer base. 
Seller makes no warranty express or implied regarding the legal status or condition of the 
property interest transferred pursuant to this Bill of Sale. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the seller has executed this Bill of Sale this $0] day of 
January, 1998. 
Roger\G\SeEaL 
Trusteewthib^ankruptcy Estate of 
DMG Color, Inc. 
James G. Swensen. Jr., USB No. 3874 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK H. WARNER, ari individual, 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
Civil No 982170702 
v. 
Judge Atherton 
DMG COLOR, INC., a Utah corporation, 
DICK M G. WARNER, an individual, 
VICKI LYNN WARNER, an individual, 
DIGITAL MEDIA GROUP, L C, a limited 
liability company, and 
DOES number 1 through 9, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Rick H. Wamer ("PlaintifF'), causes this verified Complaint to be filed by and 
through his attorney, James G. Swensen, Jr., and alleges the following as his Complaint against 
Defendants: 
1. Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (1953). 
2. Plaintiff is an individual residing at 3015 Middleton Way, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124. 
3. Defendant, DMG Color, Inc., is a Utah corporation with its last registered address at 6: 
South 2475 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. 
4. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner is an individual residing at 1657 East Haven Glen Lane, S 
Lake City, Utah 84121. 
5. Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner is an individual residing at 1657 East Haven Glen Lane, S 
Lake City, Utah 84121. 
6. Digital Media Group, L.C. is Utah limited liability company with a registered address 
1843 West 2770 South, Suite 70, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, 
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. On or about May 24, 1991, Defendant Dick M. G. Wamer, as a director and sharehotde 
of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., signed a Directors1 and Shareholders1 Consent Resolution authorizin 
Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to redeem all of its shares of capital stock owned by Plaintiff for casl 
and an Installment Note (the "Installment Note*,)l and pursuant thereto Defendant DMG Color, Inc 
contracted to redeem all of it shares of capital stock owned by Plaintiff. 
8. Since May 24, 1991 and at all times material to this action, Defendant Dick M G Warnei 
or Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer have been and are the sole 
voting shareholder(s) of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
9. A complete unity of interest and ownership exists among Defendant DMG Color, Inc., 
Defendant Dick M, G, Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer such that their separate 
personalities no longer exist and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. is in fact the alter ego of Defendant 
Dick M. G. Wamer and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer. 
2 
10. To observe the separate existence of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. 
11. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner caused Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to default on its 
payment of the Installment Note to Plaintiff and Plaintiff brought suit to collect the Installment Note 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. 920902482. 
12 On or about June 25, 1993, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
entered its Order and Judgment, Civil No 920902482, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 
DMG Color, Inc. in the amount of $200,588.51 plus interest and costs (thec< Judgment"). A copy 
of the Order and Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
13 On or about February 28, 1994, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah entered its Order, Civil No. 920902482, awarding Plaintiff all of the rights of a shareholder in 
Defendant DMG Color, Inc., except voting rights, until the Installment Note has been paid in full. 
A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
14. On or about July 19, 1994, Plaintiff caused Writs of Garnishment to be served on certain 
financial institutions used by and customers of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. in an effort to collect 
Plaintiffs Judgment against Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
15. On or about July 27,1994, Defendant DMG Color, Inc. filed a petition for reorganization 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In Re: DMG Color, Inc. Case No. 94-23721, with the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
16. On or about April 3, 1995, Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company with an address at 1842 West 2770 South, Suite 70, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, was 
3 
formed by Defendant Dick M. G Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, and Defendant I 
M. G Warner and/or Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner have since the formation of Defendant Dig 
Media Group, L C. and at all times material to this action been the sole members and managers 
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C 
17. A complete unity of interest and ownership exists among Defendant Digital Media Groi 
L C , Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner such that their separ< 
personalities no longer exist and Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. is in fact the alter ego 
Defendant Dick M. G Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer. 
18. To observe the separate existence of Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C wou 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow 
19. On or about November 30, 1995, the United States Bankruptcy Court, In Re* DM 
Color, Inc Case No 94-23721, entered its Order Converting Chapter 11 Case to Chapter 7 
20 On or about December 19, 1997, the Bankruptcy Trustee, In Re: DMG Color, Inc Cas 
No. 94-23721, filed his Motion for Order Approving Sale of Property of the Estate, stating his mten 
to sell the property, including claims and potential causes of action, or if unable to sell, his intent U 
abandon the estate's interest in the property as burdensome to the estate. 
21, On or about January 12, 1998, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order Authorizing Salt 
of Personal Property to Defendant Dick M G Warner, 
22. On or about March 13, 1998, Plaintiff caused to be delivered to the Bankruptcy Trustee, 
counsel for the Bankruptcy Trustee, Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn 
Warner a demand for action on behalf of the Defendant DMG Color, Inc. in respect of claims made 
in this Complaint. No action has been taken in response to Plaintiffs demand and it is unlikely that 
4 
any action will be taken inasmuch as Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn 
Warner are likely defendants of any such action and they claim to control the acts of Defendant 
DMG Color, Inc. and Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. 
23. Plaintiff is a shareholder and creditor of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., is the sole 
shareholder and creditor of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. similarly situated, and this action is not a 
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. 
24. Defendants transferred or caused to be transferred assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc , 
including, but not by way of limitation, customer accounts, sales, employee relationships, business 
opportunities, going concern value, and goodwill (the "Assets") for their own personal use and 
benefit. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CONVERSION 
25. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of this 
Complaint for himself and on behalf of DMG Color, Inc. 
26. Defendant Dick M G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner converted Assets of 
Defendant DMG Color, Inc. by transferring or causing to be transferred to themselves, to Defendant 
Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
27. Defendant Dick M. G, Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner exercised dominion 
or control over Assets of DMG Color, Inc., the true owner. 
28. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner acted wrongfully and 
maliciously and knowingly converted Assets of DMG Color, Inc. to their own use and benefit and 
the use and benefit of Digital Media Group, Inc. 
5 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF - WRONGFUL 
APPROPRIATION OF BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
29. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of tl 
Complaint for himself and on behalf of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
30. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner misappropriat< 
business opportunities and Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others fi 
their own personal use and benefit and aided and abetted the misappropriation of busine 
opportunities and Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their ow 
personal use and benefit, all to the detriment and damage of Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc 
31. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, while officer* 
affiliates, insiders, control persons and fiduciaries of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., negligently 
carelessly, recklessly and intentionally failed to perform their duties so that Assets of Defendant DMC 
Color, Inc. were mismanaged, wasted, diverted and siphoned off to Defendant Digital Media Group 
L.C., Defendant DickM. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, and Plaintiff and Defendant 
DMG Color, Inc. thereby suffered great loss because of such mismanagement, waste, diversion and 
siphoning. 
32. Defendant Dick M G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, while officers, 
affiliates, insiders, control persons and fiduciaries of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., negligently, 
carelessly, recklessly and intentionally failed to perform their duties in that: (a) they did not 
adequately supervise the affairs of DMG Color, Inc.; (b) they permitted and caused Assets to be 
diverted to their own use and benefit and to Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. for their own use 
and benefit; (c) they permitted and caused to paid excessive amounts of compensation to themselves 
6 
by Defendant DMG Color, Inc. and by Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C ; (d) they, individually 
and through Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C., and Digital Media Group, L.C were unjustly 
enriched. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF- FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
33. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of this 
Complaint for himself and on behalf of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
34. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner fraudulently transferred 
and conveyed Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their own 
personal use and benefit and aided and abetted the fraudulent conveyance of Assets of Defendant 
DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their own personal use and benefit, all to the 
detriment and damage of Plaintiff and DMG Color, Inc. 
35. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code 
Ann. §25-6-5(l)(a) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to 
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets with actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
36. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code 
Ann. §25-6-5(1 )(b) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to 
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. 
was engaged in a business for which remaining assets were unreasonably small. 
37. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code 
Ann. §25-6-6(1) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to 
7 
Defendant Digital Media Group, L C and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets with 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and Defendant DMG Color, I 
was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
38. That judgment be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. igair 
Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of the fair market value of the Assets transferred I 
or on behalf of Defendants 
39 That judgment be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly ar 
severally, for exemplary damages in the amount of $525,000 00 for Defendants' willful, wrongful an 
malicious acts 
40 That the amount of the unjust enrichment of Defendants Dick M G Warner, Vicki Lyn 
Warner and Digital Media Group, L.C. be ascertained and determined and that judgment be awarde< 
in favor of Plaintiff and DMG Color, Inc. against Defendants, jointly and severally, in that amount 
41 That the amount of the loss sustained by Defendant DMG Color, Inc. by reason of th< 
fraudulent acts of Defendant Dick M. G. Warner, Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner and Defendani 
Digital Media Group, L.C be ascertained and determined and that judgment be awarded in favor o\ 
Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. against Defendants, jointly and severally, in that amount. 
42. That the Court award to Plaintiff his actual damages in the amount of his Judgment and 
costs of collection. 
43. That the Court award to Plaintiff an equitable remedy of alter ego and hold Defendant 
Dick M, G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner personally liable for the debts and obligations 
8 
of Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. to Defendant .DMG Color, Inc. and to Plaintiff and for the 
debts and obligations of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to Plaintiff. 
44. That the Court award to Plaintiff interest, costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and such general relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this /I day of November, 1998. 
RickH. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
)ss: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
•A On the Lljaay of November, 1998, personally appeared before me Rick H. Warner, 
the signer of the within and foregoing Complaint, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same. 
My Commission expires: 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3015 Middleton Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
*v 
w 
fcOT* RV F\fBiJC 
'A i. > GrV.KGf- JVAOi «100 
r>jri>xecfrv;in IMH 
COMMISSION EXPi^SS 
OCT, 23. *Oi>2 
SlATC.Of UTAH 
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G Swensen, Jr., 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of your Ans 
within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to so answer, judgement by default will be taken against you for the re 
demanded in the Complaint. 
DATED this / I * day of November, 1998. 
lames G. Swensen, Jr. " 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 
Prepared and submitted by: 
HERSCHEL J. SAPESTEIN (A2861) 
STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants D. M. G. Warner, 
Vicki Lynn Warner and Digital Media 
Group, L.C. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK H. WARNER, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DMG COLOR, INC., a Utah corporation, 
DICK M.G. WARNER, an individual, VICKI 
LYNN WARNER, an individual, DIGITAL 
MEDIA GROUP, L.C, a limited liability 
company, and DOES number 1 through 9, 
Defendants. 
[Revised] 
JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING CASE 
Civil No. 982170702 
Hon. Judith S. H. Atherton 
An action was commenced by Rick H. Wamer, the plaintiff in the above-captioned case, 
against the above-named Defendants. In response thereto, Defendants Dick M.G. Warner, Vicki 
Lynn Warner, Digital Media Group, L.C. (collectively hereinafter "Defendants") moved the 
Court to dismiss the claims filed against them for cause, and to award reasonable attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Motion to Dismiss was supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a Reply Memorandum that was filed in response to 
plaintiffs opposition memorandum. 
The Court having considered the Motion to Dismiss, the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support thereof, the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, the Affidavit of 
Dick Warner, Defendants' Reply Memorandum and the opposition memorandum filed by the 
Plaintiff, hereby makes its determination of undisputed facts, conclusions of law and order of 
judgment as follows: 
DETERMINATION OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-6 & 7. 
2. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action, except for 
D.M.G. Color, Inc., based upon the appearances or record and/or the pleadings on file in the 
case. 
3- D.M.G. Color, Inc. ("D.M.G.") filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Distirict of Utah (the "Bankruptcy Court") its voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code on July 27, 1994. 
4. The Chapter 11 case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 on November 30, 
1995, and Roger Segal was appointed the permanent trustee in that case on January 16,1996. 
5. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, the Chapter 7 in bankruptcy estate was comprised of 
all property owned by D.M.G., including all causes of action and claims of D.M.G., and the 
United States Bankruptcy Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such property of 
D.M.G. pursuant to §§ 28 U.S.C. 1334(e) and 157(a). 
6. On December 19,1997, Roger Segal, as trustee, filed his motion for approval of 
the sale of all claims of D.M.G. if any (including but not limited to any alleged claims against 
Defendant Dick Warner) to the plaintiff or to the highest bidder at an auction sale to be 
conducted by the bankruptcy trustee. Certified copies of the trustee's motion for order approving 
the sale of those claims and the notice of hearing thereon are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to 
Defendants' Opening Memorandum. 
7. After a hearing was held by the Bankruptcy Court on January 12, 1998, the 
Bankruptcy Court made and entered its order dated January 13, 1998 authorizing the bankruptcy 
trustee to sell the claims, and potential causes of action, of D.M.G. to Defendant Dick Warner, 
who was the highest bidder at the sale. 
8. A copy of the Bankruptcy Court's Order approving the sale was served on the 
plaintiff. A certified copy of the Order, which includes the certificate of service, is attached as 
Exhibit C to Defendants' Opening Memorandum. 
9. Pursuant to the order of the Bankruptcy Court, a sale was held at the office of 
Roger G. Segal, as trustee, on January 7,1998. Plaintiff appeared at the auction sale with his 
counsel for the purposes of bidding for the claims to be sold by the trustee. Defendant Dick 
Warner also appeared at the sale with his attorney. 
10. At the conclusion of the sale, Roger Segal sold all claims and potential causes of 
action of DMG including the claims asserted against the Defendants herein to Dick Warner. A 
copy of the Bill of Sale which assigns and transfers said property to Defendant Media Group 
L.C., the designee of Defendant Dick Warner, is attached as Exhibit "D" to Defendants' Opening 
Memorandum. 
11. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of all claims of DMG Color, Inc. by the 
chapter 7 trustee, Roger Segal, to Defendants. As a result of the sale ordered by the United 
States Bankruptcy Court, the claims against the Defendants do not belong to the Plaintiff. 
12. The Defendants should be awarded reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because plaintiffs alleged claims were without merit and not asserted in 
good faith based upon the undisputed facts that the claims had been sold by the bankruptcy 
trustee to the Defendants in compliance with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, the Court hereby makes 
and enters its judgment as follows: 
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice is hereby 
granted, and Plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants' motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56 is hereby granted by the Court. Defendants shall file and serve an attorneys fees 
affidavit upon the Defendant. Any objection to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees shall be 
made within ten days thereafter. If no objection is timely made, then the attorney's fees shall be 
approved, and this Judgment shall be augmented thereby. 
3. Judgment for costs incurred in the action is hereby granted in favor of the 
Defendants pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the 
Clerk, of the Court, there being no reason for delay. 
DATED this A day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was 
mailed, postage prepaid, on this / gay of April, 1999 to the following: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ f t 2 - * ^ w >W rt^L^y 
459934 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [Revised] Judgment 
Dismissing Case was mailed, postage prepaid, on this day of April, 1999 to the 
following: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven W. Call 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BY THE COURT: 
